Legal Consequences of Not Paying Minimum wages to Employees?

S. N. Pattnayak
Chief Executive
Legalsindia



Labour is a simultaneous subject under the Indian Constitution. Minimum wage rates for employees are determined by both the Central Government and the Provincial Governments. These minimum wage rates are declared at the national level, state level, sector level as well as occupational levels. Minimum wages are also established for any region, sectors, occupation and also for trainees, youth as well as piece rate workers.

Minimum wage rates in India are fixed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Minimum Wages Act 1948 is a Parliament Act which concerns about Indian labor law.  This sets the minimum wages which should be paid to skilled as well as unskilled labours. In the Indian Constitution, a ‘living wage’ has defined as the level of income for a worker which ensures a basic standard of living including good health, comfort, dignity, education, and contingency. Minimum wage not only guarantees the bare existence and preserves efficiency but also provides for education, medical requirements and some level of comfort.


Payment of Wages Act 1936 says that all wages should be paid in current coin or currency notes or in both. An amendment in 2017 in the 1936 Act, now allows the employer to pay wages in coins or currency notes or by check or by crediting the wages in worker’s account. The amended Act has reserved the requirement of taking prior authorization from the worker about the mode of payment of wages. The relevant government can specify certain industrial or other establishments requiring those to pay either by check or bank transfer.

According to the provisions under Payment of Wages Act, 1936 wages need to be paid before the termination of the 7th day after the last day of the wage period where there are less than 1000 workers employed and in rest case on the 10th day. Also, the payment of wages has to be in current coin or currency notes and by cheques or by crediting the wages in the employee’s bank account after obtaining his written authority.

Each and every employer is responsible for the payment of all wages compulsory to be paid under the Payment of Wages Act in 1936 to persons employed by him.

Penalties can be imposed on employers for breakings of any provisions of the Act. For breaking of Section 5, 7 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the act which mentions about timely payment of wages, fines , extentpayment of wages in current coins and currency, deductions for damage or recovery of advances or loans. In such cases fine not less than Ra. 1000 whicextend to Rs. 5000 can be imposed and on subsequent conviction fine between Rs. 5000 and Rs. 10000 is imposed.

For failing to maintain registers, wilfully refusing or neglecting to provide information or refusing to answer or wilfully giving a false information required to be furnished under the Act. Fine not less than 1000 Rs. and Maximum of Rs. 5000 charged for such offences. For second or subsequent verdict fine not less than 5000 Rs. and extend to Rs.10000 can be charged.

Offences such as paying his employees less than the minimum wages fixed or failure to pay them overtime wages and for work done by them on the day of rest, etc. is punishable under Section 22 of Minimum Wages Act, 1948 by imprisonment up to six months or fine or both.

Section 22 B provides that cognizance of offence should be taken only when the Authority under Section 20 of the Act sanctions the application and the appropriate Government gives its sanction to file a complaint.

Section 22 C of the act describes who could be believed guilty in case if the employer happens to be an incorporated body or firm or association of persons, etc.

Section 22 D deals with the cases of payment of wages due to an employee who is dead or not traceable.

Current Minimum Wage Rate as per LABOUR DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Delhi, the 3rd March 2017  is given below

No. F. Addl.LC/Lab/MW/2016/4859.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948) read with the Government of India, erstwhile Ministry of States notification No.104-J dated the 24th August, 1950 and Ministry of Home Affairs notification No.S.O.530. dated the 6th February, 1967 and all other powers enabling him in this behalf and in continuation of notification no. F.12 (1)142/11/MW/Lab/ 2023-2047 dated the 26th July, 2011, the Lt. Governor of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, after considering the recommendations of the Minimum Wages Advisory Committee constituted vide notification no. 13(16)/MW/1/2008/Lab./1859 dated the 15th September, 2016 under sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and Cabinet Decision no. 2466 dated the 25th February, 2017 of Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi is pleased to revise, the minimum rates of wages for the class of workmen/employees mentioned in all the Schedule employments as mentioned in earlier notification no. F.12 (1)142/11/MW/Lab/ 2023-2047 dated the 26th July, 2011, in the National Capital Territory of Delhi, namely:—





These rates shall come into force with effect from the date of notification in the Official Gazette.

Note: 1. The minimum rates of wages being fixed are linked with All India Consumer Price Index Series, 2001 (Base 2001=100). For Dearness Allowance neutralization, the rate of adjustment shall be Rs. 1.35 per point for Unskilled, Rs. 1.50 per point for Semi skilled, Rs. 1.65 per point for Skilled, Rs. 1.50 per point for Non matriculates, Rs. 1.65 per point for Matriculates but not Graduate and Rs. 1.80 per point for Graduate and above. Adjustment will be made six monthly, i.e., on 1st April and 1st October each year after taking into account the average index numbers for July to December of the previous year and January to June of the current year respectively.

2. In case there is decline in All India Consumer Price Index, as a result of which dearness allowance apparently decreases, in that case there shall be no impact on notified applicable minimum rates of wages for different category of workmen/employees.
v
3. Amount of Dearness Allowance in fraction, if any, would be rounded off to the next higher rupee.

4. It is further clarified that after revision in minimum rates of wages, all workmen who are covered under The Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 and Employees Provident Fund & Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 and the employers would continue to deposit employer’s contribution towards ESI and PF as per prescribed rates of contribution.

THESE JUDGMENTS WILL HELPFUL TO THOSE HUSBANDS WHO ARE SEEKING FOR JUSTICE.

Satya Narayan Pattnayak
Chief Executive
Legalsindia



List Of Judgments Where Maintenance Denied To Wife

These are the list of judgments in which Maintenance denied to wives. These judgments will helpful to those husbands who are seeking for justice.

 1. MUMBAI HIGH COURT: Dated  17 July, 1991

Same relief (maintenance)cannot be asked twice in two different courts

2. MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT: Madhuri Bai vs Minor Surendra Kumar And Anr. on 24 April, 1998

Child can claim maintenance u/s 125 from mother

3.  HIGH COURT OF P & H :  Dated 28 July 1961

Maintenance not based on Arithmetic Calculation

4.  KARNATAKA HIGH COURT: Dated 22 September 1992

Women to Prove legitimacy of child for maintenance

5.  MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT : Dated 24 March 2000

No Interim/Maintenance for Capable, Working Women

6. DELHI HIGH COURT  : Dated 28 July 2008

She was earning and she had not come to the Court with clean hands.

7. MADRAS HIGH COURT : Dated 22 Feb 2008

Wife Troubled -No Maintenance

8. SUPREME COURT  : Dated 23 March, 2009

SC Judgement on HMA24 - Wife working no maintenance

9. HIGH COURT OF P & H

Maintenance awarded in two sections to be offset

10. HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Old Parents, Maintenance reduced.

11. MUMBAI HIGH COURT: Dated 22 February, 2008

Perjury in 125 crPc

12.  MUMBAI HIGH COURT  : Dated Apr 2008.

Maintenance not granted as it is proved no reason to leave husbands.

13. MADRAS HIGH COURT: S.Chandra vs C.V.Sridharan on 21 February 2007

Claim alimony within 6 Months of Divorce

14. DELHI HIGH COURT: Sanjay Bhardwaj & Ors. vs The State & Anr. on 27 August, 2010

Unemployed man can not be forced to pay Maintenance

15. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: Ines Miranda vs Santosh K Swamy dated 14 December 2010

TRANSFER PETITION – Payment to Husband

16. MUMBAI HIGH COURT  :  Dated 4 Feb 2005

Maintenance not granted as it is proved that wife wants to reside separately.

17. DELHI COURT : METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, NEW DELHI

Vexatious petition, maintenance, relief is declined

18. BOMBAY HIGH COURT :  Dated 14 March 2011

Perjury Judgement : Rigorous imprisonment for False Case

19. ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE (CENTRAL)TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI: Dated  15 April 2011

Maintenance claim based on Affidavit dismissed

20. PUNJAB - HARYANA HIGH COURT: Dated  17 February 2011

Maintenance claim based on Affidavit dismissed

21. DELHI HIGH COURT

Husband Property Not Counted in Maintenance

22.  CHENNAI HIGH COURT  : Dated 21 June 2002

Maintenance Denied

23. DELHI HIGH COURT  : Dated 1 September, 2010

Claim of high status of husband not sufficient for interim maintenance

24.  DELHI HIGH COURT  : Dated 30 August, 2010

Multiple Maintenance petitions are not allowed

25. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated 20 July, 2010

Reduced Interim Maintenance

26.  SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  11 June, 1993

No Maintenance

27. MUMBAI HIGH COURT :  Dated  18 July, 2009

No Maintenance to Wife if RCR By Husband Succeed

28. MUMBAI HIGH COURT

Permanent Alimony Cancelled.

29. MUMBAI HIGH COURRT: Dated 2010

Income Tax and Maintenance

30. MUMBAI HIGH COURRT: Dated 18 November 2010

Income tax returns cannot decide Maintenance

31. MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT: Dated 29 August 1991

Challenging the rejected interim maintenance

32. PUNJAB HARYANA HIGH COURT: Dated 25 January, 2010

False affidavit, perjury procedure in 24 HMA

33. DELHI HIGH COURT  : Dated 7 September 2006

Divorce withdrawn – Maintenance to be paid

34. DELHI HIGH COURT: Dated 16 November 2004

Father In Law not responsible for Residence

36. CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION

Bank Account Details and confidentiality

37. BOMBAY HIGH COURT: Dated  15 September, 2004

Return of Stridhan, Alimony and Hiding Past

38. GAUHATI HIGH COURT: Dated  23 April, 2004

Guardianship within 2 Months

39. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  9 March, 2010

Fine for Delaying tactics by Lawyer

40. CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION

Central Information Commission - CIC Order in Passport Details

41. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  25 October, 2010

Petitioner must claim she is unable to maintain herself for relief of maintenance

42. ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT : Dated  25 March, 1976

Petitioner must claim she is unable to maintain herself for relief of maintenance

43. KARNATAKA HIGH COURT : Dated 13 February, 1980

She should prove that she is unable to maintain herself in addition to the facts that

her husband has sufficient means

to maintain her and that he has neglected to maintain her

44. KARNATAKA HIGH COURT : Dated  22 August, 2005

No maintenance for earning wife

45. DISTRICT COURT , SAKET, DELHI : Dated  18 Nov 2010

Employable wife not entitled to maintenance.

46. DISTRICT COURT , SAKET, DELHI : Dated 24 March 2008

An NRI wins an interim maintenance case

47. FAMILY COURT , HYDERABAD

Hyderabad Family court, unclean hands, no maintenance

48. DELHI HIGH COURT: Dated  17 April 2007

Conditions when maintenance to be paid

49. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  11 January, 2011

All State Amendments in Sec. 125 are invalid

50. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated 17 February, 2006

Habeas Corpus for girl child custody to Father

51. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated 28 April, 2005

Habeas Corpus dismissed in Custody Appeal

52. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  21 November, 2006

Custody to remarried women

53. MADRAS HIGH COURT : Dated 25 January, 2006

Habeas Corpus on Custody to Father

54. MADRAS HIGH COURT : Dated 6 February, 2006

Habeas Corpus for Custody on Death

55. KERALA HIGH COURT : Dated  December, 2010

NBW cannot be issued for non-payment of maintenance

56. CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION

CIC – Income Tax Details of FIL are public

57. UTTARANCHAL HIGH COURT : Dated  17 March, 2011

HC Quash Maintenance

58. MUMBAI HIGH COURT :Dated  13 September, 1995

No multiple maintenance claims

59. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  9 October, 1985

Magistrate can grant interim maintenance ?

61. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  16 February, 2000

Habeas Corpus in Custody

62. MADRAS HIGH COURT : Dated  27 March, 2007

Habeas Corpus in Divorce / Custody Petition

63.SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  17 October, 1974

Separate income of the wife can be taken into account in determining the amount of maintenance payable to her

64. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  31 January, 2003

HMA moveable property cannot be termed as Income

65. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  18 September, 2008

Maintenance On Actual Earnings

66. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  30 September, 2008

Parents can kick out their Children

67. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  28 March, 2000

Liability of maintenance of children is co-extensive

68. GUJRAT HIGH COURT : Dated on 21 October 2010

No Multiple maintenance

69. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  12 October, 2009

DV can be filed anywhere

70. MADRAS HIGH COURT : Dated  28 October, 2010

Magistrate should not blindly call all family members as respondents

71. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  4 October, 2010

DVA only against who are in domestic relationship

72. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  20 September, 2010

How to decide domestic relationship in DVA

73. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  8 February, 2010

Frivolous petition claiming damages dismissed

74. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated  7 January, 2010

Maintenance, Women fined, Contempt of Court

75. ANDHRA HIGH COURT : Dated  15 November, 1995

Maintenance to illegitimate Child

76. CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION

RTI – Husband can get Wife PF details

77. ANDHRA HIGH COURT : Dated  31 March, 1989

Maintenance arrears for 1 year only !

78. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  6 December, 2005

Fine for forcibly taking away Child

79. MADRAS HIGH COURT : Dated  28 February, 2007

Family Court Jurisdiction

80. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  2 March 2000

Wife is not entitled to maintenance who has deserted her husband,

81. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  03 December 2009

No Maintenance If Wife Lies

82. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated  28 April 2009

Take EMI Into Consideration in Maintenance

83. HIGH COURT OF STATE OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH : Dated 13 March 2009

No alimony to Women who desert her husband

84. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated 23 February, 2009

Interim maintenance increase illegal as no income proof produced

85. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated 20 July, 2010

Interim maintenance  amount should be based on status of both part

86. CHATTISGARAH HIGH COURT : Dated 15 February, 2004

No maintenance for a deserting wife

87. RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT: Dated 22 January, 1999

No maintenance for a deserting wife

88. BOMBAY HIGH COURT : Dated 26 February, 2010

Interim maintenance cannot be increased based on husband's salary hike.

89. GUJARAT HIGH COURT : Dated 9 February, 2011

Children has to maintain parents.

90. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated 20 July 2011

Meaning of unable to maintain

91. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated 27 November 2007

Unable to maintain herself in Maintenance

92. DISTRICT & SESSION JUDGE DELHI : Dated 28th August 2010

Landmark Judgement for DV Case

93. CHENNAI HIGH COURT : Dated 26th August 2010

Perjury Case

94. ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT : Dated 19 January, 2010

Wife fined 10,000/- in Perjury case but Husband fighting for further action!!

95. DELHI HIGH COURT : Dated 18 August, 2010

Every allegations do not justify initiation of prosecution under 340 CRPC

96. KARNATAKA HIGH COURT : Dated 15 March, 2001

Petition under CrPC 340 must be decided only at the end

97. ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT : Dated 09 January 2003

Perjury application must be decided first before proceeding with the case

98. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated 14 November, 1994

No one should indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods : 2 weeks Jail

99. GUJARAT HIGH COURT  : Dated 18 August, 2010

Petitioner agreed for perjury – Gujrat HC told to deposit 25K as probable fine

100. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA : Dated 1 December, 2010

Whether offence of abetment to commit suicide is made out if wife commits suicide in her matrimonial home?

Budhiyarinbai (PW4) has also admitted in her cross-examination that her daughter Jamunbai used to come to the maternal house on every occasions of Tijafestival and after the festival they used to take her to her matrimonial house. She also admitted that father of her daughter used to go to the matrimonial house of their daughter and return after knowing well being of their daughter. She further admitted that they did not report about assault or beating to their daughter nor did they call any panchayat meeting in this regard. In paragraph 8, she has categorically admitted that during the period of 4 years their daughter never complained of any assault on her. In paragraph 9 also, she admitted that her daughter was coming to her maternal house happily and was returning to her matrimonial house happily. She never refused to go back to her matrimonial house.

 He further admitted that during those 2 years, he never listened about any beating given to the deceased by her in-laws. From the above also, the prosecution case does not find support.
In the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur
(Before Arvind Singh Chandel, J.)
 Chhannu, S/o Tikaram Sahu, 
v.
State of Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh) .
Criminal Appeal No. 2537 of 1999
Decided on November 6, 2017, 
Citation:
2017 SCC OnLine Chh 1234
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Arvind Singh Chandel, J.:— This appeal has been preferred by the accused/Appellants under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment dated 30.8.1999 passed in Sessions Trial No. 16 of 1999 by the 5thAdditional Sessions Judge, Durg convicting the accused/Appellants under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation.
2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the marriage between Jamunbai (deceased) and Appellant Chhannu took place in the year 1994. After one year of the marriage, Gauna ceremony was performed. Appellant Tikaram is father-in-law and Appellant Suhawan Bai is mother-in-law of Jamunbai. It is alleged that after theGauna ceremony, Jamunbai was permitted to go back to her maternal house only on the occasion of Tija festival. When she went her maternal house, she told her parents that the accused/Appellants keep her hungry and they also do not give her the articles of her daily use and they have expelled her from their house. Whenever any member of her maternal house wanted to visit her at her matrimonial house, the Appellants did not allow that member to visit her. They used to doubt her and for this they used to beat her. It is further alleged that due to the harassment given to her, she committed suicide by hanging herself at her matrimonial house on 3.10.1998. Same day, at about 10:30 p.m., Appellant Tikaram informed about the death in Police Station Pulgaon, District Durg. Morgue Intimation No. 72/98 was registered on 3.10.1998. After inquiry, First Information Report (Ex.P5) was registered against the Appellants for the offence under Section 306/34 of the Indian Penal Code. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the Appellants under Sections 306/34 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Charge was framed against them under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. So as to hold the accused/Appellants guilty, the prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses in support of its case. Statements of the accused/Appellants under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were also recorded in which they denied the guilt. They took the defence that Jamunbai (deceased) was suffering from panic stomach ache and head ache, which were being treated by Dr. Kothari and one Yashwant Sahu of the village and she committed suicide due to the illness.
4. After trial, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused/Appellants as mentioned in the first paragraph of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.
5. Learned Counsel appearing for the accused/Appellants argued that there was no complaint lodged by Jamunbai or by her parents before her death. No panchayat meeting was also called on behalf of Jamunbai. Except the close relatives of deceased Jamunbai, no independent witness has supported the case of the prosecution. Chintaram (PW3), Budhiyarinbai (PW4) and Baliram (PW7) are close relatives of the deceased. Therefore, they are interested witnesses and their statements are contradictory. Their statements are not reliable. The offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code is not proved beyond doubt.
6. Per contra, Learned Counsel appearing for the State supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the same does not warrant any interference by this Court.
7. I have heard Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record including the impugned judgment minutely.
8. In support of its case, the prosecution has examined total 8 witnesses. Assistant Sub-Inspector B.R. Dhurve (PW5) is the witness who registered the FIR (Ex.P5). Bodhanlal (PW1) is a panch witness. He deposed that in his presence, Naksha Panchayatnama (Ex.P3) was prepared. Dr. R.N. Pandey (PW2) has proved the post mortem report (Ex.P4). He deposed that he found a ligature mark measuring 11″ × 1/4″ over the thyroid cartilage on the neck. As per his opinion, cause of the death was asphyxia which took place ante mortem. The time of death was within 30 hours from the post mortem examination. The statements of above witnesses have been unrebutted, therefore, it is clear that death of Jamunbai occurred due to hanging in her matrimonial house.
9. As per the prosecution story, after the Gauna ceremony, Jamunbai was permitted to go back to her maternal house only on the occasion of Tija festival. She was not being given complete food and also the articles of her daily use at the matrimonial house. In support of its case, the prosecution has examined Chintaram (PW3), father of Jamunbai, Budhiyarinbai (PW4), mother of Jamunbai and Baliram (PW7), brother-in-law (Jija) of Jamunbai. No other witness has been examined in this regard. Therefore, it is clear that the prosecution has examined only close relatives of deceased Jamunbai. Since all these witnesses are close relatives of deceased Jamunbai and no independent witness has been examined, therefore, a minute examination of the evidence of these witnesses is required.
10. Chintaram (PW3), father of the deceased has deposed that after the marriage, her daughter Jamunbai had stayed at her matrimonial house for about 3 years. She came back to her maternal house only on Tija festival every year. When she came to her maternal house, she was complaining that her father-in-law was harassing her and was scolding while visit of any guest at the matrimonial house. He further deposed that the accused/Appellants were beating her, not giving her food and they were also not giving her footwear and clothes (saree etc.). On visit of any of her relatives, she was not allowed to talk to that relative. The Appellants were not caring her properly.
11. Budhiyarinbai (PW4), mother of the deceased has deposed that whenever her daughter Jamunbai came to her maternal house on the occasion of Tija festival, on being asked by her, she told that her in-laws were not giving her food, doubting her and were beating her. She further deposed that when her daughter Jamunbai had come to her maternal house before her death, she had told her that she was being beaten by the in-laws.
12. Chintaram (PW3) has admitted in his cross-examination that he used to go to the matrimonial house of her daughter Jamunbai and asked her well being. On every occasions of Tija festival, her daughter was properly given farewell at her matrimonial house. He further admitted that her daughter used to come to her maternal house. He also admitted that he never reported about the beating to her daughter nor did he call any panchayat meeting in this regard.
13. Budhiyarinbai (PW4) has also admitted in her cross-examination that her daughter Jamunbai used to come to the maternal house on every occasions of Tijafestival and after the festival they used to take her to her matrimonial house. She also admitted that father of her daughter used to go to the matrimonial house of their daughter and return after knowing well being of their daughter. She further admitted that they did not report about assault or beating to their daughter nor did they call any panchayat meeting in this regard. In paragraph 8, she has categorically admitted that during the period of 4 years their daughter never complained of any assault on her. In paragraph 9 also, she admitted that her daughter was coming to her maternal house happily and was returning to her matrimonial house happily. She never refused to go back to her matrimonial house.
14. From the above statements of Chintaram (PW3) and Budhiyarinbai (PW4), it is clear that their daughter/deceased used to visit at her maternal house on every occasions of Tija festival. It is also clear that father of the deceased also used to visit the matrimonial house of the deceased. From the admission of Budhiyarinbai (PW4) in paragraph 8, it is also clear that the deceased never complained of beating to her by the in-laws during the period of 4 years. From her admission, it is further clear that the deceased was happily going to her matrimonial house and she never refused to go to her matrimonial house. From the statements of both these witnesses, it is clear that there were small domestic issues between the deceased and her in-laws and she was not having any grievance against the issues.
15. Baliram (PW7), brother-in-law (Jija) of the deceased has stated that once he had gone to the matrimonial house of the deceased. At that time, the Appellants had not talked to him, therefore, he had returned therefrom. At that time, the deceased had told him that whenever any of her relatives visits there, they do not talk to the relative. She had also told him that after returning of the relative, they beat her. In paragraph 6 of his cross-examination, he has admitted that this incident took place before 2 years of the death of the deceased. He further admitted that during those 2 years, he never listened about any beating given to the deceased by her in-laws. From the above also, the prosecution case does not find support.
16. Chintaram (PW3) has admitted that Jamunbai was suffering from head ache and due to which she was disturbed. Budhiyarinbai (PW4) has also admitted that Jamunbai was suffering from head ache and that was being got treated by her in-laws.
17. From the above discussion, it is clear that though deceased Jamunbai committed suicide in her matrimonial house yet from the evidence on record it is clear that the deceased used to visit her maternal house on every occasions of Tijafestival and return thereafter to her matrimonial house. Her maternal relatives also used to visit her at her matrimonial house. According to Budhiyarinbai (PW4), mother of the deceased, the deceased happily came to her maternal house on every occasions of Tija festival and she never refused to return to her matrimonial house. It is also clear from the admission of the mother of the deceased that the deceased never complained of any assault on her before her death. The deceased had complained of assault on her during her last visit to her maternal house before her death, but no report had been lodged in this regard nor any panchayat meeting was called. From the evidence on record, it appears that no grievous issue was involved between the deceased and her in-laws which could abet her to commit suicide. Merely because the deceased committed suicide in her matrimonial house, her in-laws and husband cannot be charged for harassment and abetment to commit suicide. Though the deceased committed suicide in her matrimonial house yet there is no conclusive evidence against her in-laws and husband, i.e., the Appellants to hold them guilty.
18. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The Appellants are acquitted of the charge framed against them.
19. It is reported that the Appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds shall continue for a further period of six months from today in terms of Section 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
20. Record of the Court below be sent back along with a copy of this judgment forthwith for information and necessary compliance.

Whether proceeding for divorce will be barred by res judicata if there is decree or dismissal of suit for restitution of conjugal rights?

To elucidate it further, the conjoint consideration of Section 9 read with Section 13A is relevant.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Appeal from Order No. 552 of 2015

Decided On: 22.06.2017

Balveer Singh Vs. Harjeet Kaur

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rajiv Sharma and Sharad Kumar Sharma, JJ.

Citation:AIR 2017 UTTAR175


1. The core issue of debate in the present appeal from order, preferred by the husband is the adjudication made by the Court below by the judgment dated 28.9.2015 in the Suit No. 77 of 2013, whereby while deciding issue No. 2, the Court has held that the Bar of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not come into play, when the Bar is being sought to be attracted on the basis of the proceeding under Section 9 vis-a-vis proceeding under Section 13A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The appellant on 26.2.2013 had filed a petition under Section 13A of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of the marriage, which was said to have been solemnized between the plaintiff and the defendant on 15.6.1984. Although not relevant, but still it could be said that the grounds for dissolution of marriage as pleaded, was mental cruelty, misbehavior, physical assaults and the solemnization of second marriage with another female namely Paramjit Kaur. In the said suit the pleadings were exchanged. On the exchange of the pleadings, one of the issues which cropped up and was framed as to whether the suit in question would be barred by Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure in view of the fact that the proceedings under Section 9 stood decided.

2. For the scrutiny of the aforesaid issue, reference to Section 11 as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure is necessary and is quoted herein below for convenience:

"11. Res judicata.-No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court."
3. The principle enunciated in Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure provides that no Court should try any suit or 'issue' in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially decided in a formal suit. The stress would be on the term 'issue' used under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act reads as under:

"9. Restitution of conjugal rights-When either the husband or the wife has; without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the District Court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the Court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements, made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly."
4. On a simpliciter reading of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it has altogether a different purpose. The purpose of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is to meet a contingency. It deals with a situation where a married couple for no justifiable reason is withdrawing himself from discharging the obligations attached to the institution of marriage, which at the hand of one of them is attempted to be settled together. The grant of relief of the restitution is subject to the satisfaction being established of non meeting of the matrimonial obligations.

5. To elucidate it further, the conjoint consideration of Section 9 read with Section 13A is relevant.

6. Whereas Section 13A of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 deals with the alternative relief in divorce proceedings where the Court in the principal proceedings under Section 13(1) and in its sub-clauses, alternatively feels instead of dissolving the marriage, to grant a decree of 'judicial separation' and, yet again is only an enabling provision to the Court to have an alternative recourse of judicial separation instead of dissolving the marriage under Section 13 for raising institution of marriage. It would be reasonable to infer that the invocation of Section 13A is enabling the Court to have a situation to meet and grant an alternative decree of judicial separation instead of dissolution of marriage.

7. If both the provisions if are scrutinized harmoniously, the Legislature in all its wisdom had provided that the two sections i.e. Section 9 and Section 13A of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Provided to meet a separate set of contingencies, while maintaining a matrimonial relationship and its continuance. Under no set of circumstances or reasonableness, Section 9 deals or touches the issue, which is either covered by Section 13 or by Section 13A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Thus, both the provisions are divergent to one another one aims to bring family together and the other is a judicial process to separate the family for the grounds provided under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and to meet a different purpose.Hence adjudication made by the Court under any of the aforesaid provisions, this Court feels would not attract Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to create a Bar in filing of a subsequent suit under either of the provisions under Section 9 or 13A of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

8. Even otherwise also, if a proceeding under Section 9 is initiated by any other party to the family disputes, its allowing would be ending up of the controversy between the parties or will aggravate the dispute between them. Allowing or rejection of Section 9 will not create any impediment for Section 13 and Section 13A, as they are independent to Section 9. Thus Section 9 will not eclipse the statutory effect of Section 13A. Thus, the bar of Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure will not come into to play.

9. Normally, it has been witnessed that whenever there is family feud and the acrimony between the husband and wife, the foremost effort which is made by either of the parties to pave a ground for subsequent proceedings under Section 13 is to initiate Section 9 and Section 13A, thus subsequently under Section 13 happens to be a consequence of the failure of Section 9. In that view of the matter too, an adjudication under Section 9 prior in time, would not create a Bar under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

10. The contention of the appellant in the case at hand to the effect that Suit No. 135 of 2006 preferred under Section 9 since has been decreed, hence proceedings under Section 13A would not be maintainable is a misconception.

11. In the present case, the appellant's stands is since Section 9 has been decreed, hence Section 13A would be barred by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This analogy is not accepted for the rational that in the case at hand, Section 9 was decreed prior to file Section 13A. It will not have any effect on Section 13A, for the simple reason because if Section 9 is either decreed or dismissed, it will not take away a right of a party to file Section 13 for dissolution of marriage at any subsequent stage. Hence also, from this view point, Section 11 will not be attracted and both the proceedings either under Section 9 and Section 13 is to be decided independently.

12. In view of the above, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The learned Family Court, District Udham Singh Nagar at Rudrapur is directed to decide the Suit No. 77 of 2013, Harjeet Kanrv. Balveer Singh under Section 13A of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 as expeditiously as possible, keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 21B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Bench has stated that,”The provision seems quite archaic and, especially, when there is a societal progress”.

On Friday, Supreme Court has decided to re-examine the question whether a woman and a man in an adulterous relationship can be treated as the partners in crime .
The Apex Court will re-examine validity of the Section 497 of Indian Penal Code which, for the last 158 years has absolved the married women from being charged with adultery.
SC’s Three Judge Bench comprising of CJI Dipak Misra and Justices A M Khanwilkar and D Y Chandrachud, had entertained the PIL challenging gender discriminatory provision in Indian Penal Code and had sought Centre’s response.
Apex Court Benh held that it prima facie felt that the consistent rulings of Supreme Court validating Section 497 of IPC required reconsideration by its Five-Judge Bench.
Earlier SC rulings in favour of keeping the adulterous married women out of purview of law, but the CJI led SC Bench is firm on a de-novo reconsideration of the matter.
Bench further added that,”We think it is appropriate that earlier judgments required to be reconsidered, regard being had to the social progression, perceptual shift, gender equality and gender sensitivity”.
Ape Court has felt that it was about time to examine whether the affirmative action mandated under Article 15(3) of Constitution to benefit women in general could legally and judicially translate into absolving them of the prosecution in a crime for which men are punished and women are willing or consensual partners.

Historic Judgment on restitution of conjugal right against wife who was married she was child

It is a misnomer to call this a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights. When a married couple, after cohabitation separate and live apart, either of them can bring a suit against the other for the restitution of conjugal rights according to the practice in England, and according to the later practice of the Courts in India. But the present suit is not of that character. 
  
The parties to the present suit went through the religious ceremony of marriage eleven years ago when the defendant was a child of eleven years of age. They have never cohabited. And now that the defendant is a woman of twenty-two, the plaintiff asks the Court to compel her to go to his house, that he may complete his contract with her by consummating the marriage, The defendant, being now of full age, objects to going to live with the plaintiff, objects to allowing him to consummate the marriage, objects to ratifying and completing the contract entered into on her behalf by her guardians while she was yet of tender age. It seems to me that it would be a barbarous, a cruel, a revolting thing to do to compel a young lady under those circumstances to go to a man whom she dislikes, in order that he may cohabit with her against her will; and I am of opinion that neither the law nor the practice of our Courts either justified my malting such an order, or even justifies the plaintiff in maintaining the present suit.
Bombay High Court
Dadaji Bhikaji vs Rukhmabai on 21 September, 1885
Equivalent citations: (1885) ILR 9 Bom 529

Bench: Pinhey

1. Mr. Advocate-General, unless you are particularly anxious to make some remarks for the assistance of the Court, I think I need not trouble you as I am prepared to dispose, of the case at once. I have been considering the case since it was last before the Court on Saturday, and I have been looking into the authorities, and I have arrived at the opinion that the plaintiff cannot maintain this action.
2. It is a misnomer to call this a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights. When a married couple, after cohabitation separate and live apart, either of them can bring a suit against the other for the restitution of conjugal rights according to the practice in England, and according to the later practice of the Courts in India. But the present suit is not of that character. The parties to the present suit went through the religious ceremony of marriage eleven years ago when the defendant was a child of eleven years of age. They have never cohabited. And now that the defendant is a woman of twenty-two, the plaintiff asks the Court to compel her to go to his house, that he may complete his contract with her by consummating the marriage, The defendant, being now of full age, objects to going to live with the plaintiff, objects to allowing him to consummate the marriage, objects to ratifying and completing the contract entered into on her behalf by her guardians while she was yet of tender age. It seems to me that it would be a barbarous, a cruel, a revolting thing to do to compel a young lady under those circumstances to go to a man whom she dislikes, in order that he may cohabit with her against her will; and I am of opinion that neither the law nor the practice of our Courts either justified my malting such an order, or even justifies the plaintiff in maintaining the present suit.
3. I have looked through the reported decisions of the Courts in England and of the Court's in India; but I cannot find one that covers the ground covered by the facts of this case. There is not an instance, that I know of, in which a Court has compelled a woman, who has gone through the religious ceremony of marriage with a man, to allow that man to consummate the marriage against her will. It may, of course, be said that in England marriages are generally celebrated between persons of mature age, who usually consummate the marriage on the same day, and that, therefore, one must not expect to find a case on all fours with this among the English cases. But, then, on the other hand it must be remembered that the practice of allowing suits for the restitution of conjugal rights (and that is what is asked for in the plaint) originated in England under peculiar circumstances, and was transplanted from England into India. It has no foundation in Hindu law-the religious law of the parties to the suit. Under the Hindu law such a suit would not be cognizable by a Civil- Court. For many years after I came to India such suits were not allowed. It is only of late years the practice of allowing such suits has been introduced into this country from England; (I think only since the amalgamation of the old Supreme and Sadar Courts in the present High Courts has brought English lawyers more into contact with the mufassal),
4. This being so, I think I am not bound to carry the practice further than I find support for in the English authorities, especially when the granting of the relief prayed would produce consequences revolting not only to civilized persons, but even to untutored human beings possessed of ordinary delicacy of feeling. The practice of allowing those suits in England has become much discredited, and has been rendered almost inoperative by the legislation of the past year. See Stat. 47 & 48 Vic, cap. 68, Section 2. It is, in my opinion, matter for regret that it was ever introduced into this country. "As, however, it has been introduced into this country," I am bound to follow it so far as it has received the sanction of this Court or of the Privy Council. I find, however, neither precedent nor authority for granting the relief asked for in this suit, and I am certainly not disposed to make a precedent, or to extend the practice of the Court in respect of suits of this nature beyond the point for which I find authority. The defendant has not appeared in Court, but the evidence shows that she has been brought up in the enlightened and cultivated home of her step-father, the late much-lamented Dr. Sakharam Arjna, a well-known citizen of Bombay. I am glad, therefore, that, in the view of the law which I take, I am not obliged to grant the plaintiff the relief which he seeks, and to compel this young lady of twenty-two to go to the house of the plaintiff in order that he may consummate the marriage arranged for her during her helpless infancy.

5. Before concluding my remarks I wish to guard myself from being supposed to endorse the contention in the written statement, that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim the society of his wife because he is poor. A poor man has as much right to claim his wife as a rich man to claim his. The plaintiff gave much false evidence as to his pecuniary position; and his uncle, who was examined on plaintiff's behalf on the same point, gave, if possible, evidence less credible still. Nevertheless, the general result of the evidence shows that plaintiff can earn a livelihood and keep a wife (as he himself said repeatedly) "according to my poor circumstances." The poverty of the plaintiff is not one of the reason's which I should give for the rejection of plaintiff's claim. There will be decree for the defendant with costs.